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Introduction 
European private law is not even 25 years old as a discipline, but its develop-
ment, abrupt shifts in direction, institutional limitations and irrationalities 
make it a typical child of European integration. During the first decades which 
followed the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome, the idea that the Common 
Market needed a common legal infrastructure for market transactions was not 
widespread. Instead, the Community was dedicated to removing the most ob-
vious obstacles to trade such as tariffs, quotas and equivalent measures, and 
national private laws, in particular contract laws, were similar enough so as to 
enable most cross-border market transactions. Only with the discovery of the 
consumer, not only as an economic actor but also as a market citizen, did the 
EC develop an interest in regulating private law from a consumer law perspec-
tive. Yet it was only after the introduction of qualified majority voting in the 
Single European Act of 1986 that the EC managed to enact the bulk of con-
sumer law directives covering inter alia doorstep sales, consumer credits, 
package tours, timesharing rights in immovables, unfair contractual terms, 
guarantees in sales and distance sales. However, private law has also been af-
fected by European measures with other political objectives such as banking, 
insurance and payment regulations, e.g. the 1998 Late Payment Directive 
aimed at protecting small and medium sized enterprises. Most recently, con-
sumer law integration has led to the 2007 Green Paper on the Review of the 
Consumer Acquis1 and the 2008 proposal for a horizontal Directive on Con-
sumer Rights2 which integrates the Unfair Terms, the Guarantee, the Doorstep 
and Distance Sales Directives. Whereas the consumer law directives had ini-
tially generated little case law (via references of national courts to the ECJ un-
der Art. 234 TEC), this situation has changed since the turn of the millennium. 
Indeed, the ECJ is increasingly confronted with core issues of private law, and 
several decisions have generated a lot of controversial discussions. 
Beyond consumer law, the integration of general contract law had for years 
remained a passion of academics who since the 1970ies had been assembled in 
the Lando group on European contract law and other transnational circles. The 
European Parliament supported these efforts in two resolutions of 1989 and 
1994 which strongly recommend a European Civil Code that should deal with 
private law comprehensively. Following the example of the grand national 
codifications, it should provide a symbolic basis of a common identity of 
European citizens. However, this project, albeit limited to contract law as an 
initial step, was only introduced on the agenda of the EC in the late nineties in 
                                                 
1  COM (2007), 744 final. 
2  COM (2008), 614 final. 
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the wake of the euphoric “constitutional movement” leading to the Nice Fun-
damental Rights Charter and the Laeken mandate to elaborate a constitutional 
treaty. At the 1999 Council summits of Cologne and Tampere, the Council 
took a positive view on a European contract law instrument and mandated the 
Commission to launch a preparatory process. As a first step, the Commission 
elaborated the 2001 White Paper on contract law where different legal policy 
options were presented and a consultation process launched.3 The feedback 
from legal science, practice, business and politics prompted the Commission in 
its 2003 Action Plan4 to call for a horizontal instrument alongside further 
measures of sector-specific integration in order to increase the overall coher-
ence of European private law. To this end, a “Common Framework of Refer-
ence” (CFR) which should contain common terminology, principles and rules 
on core areas of private law, should be elaborated. The CFR should constitute 
the basis of a subsequent “optional instrument” – a seemingly harmless neolo-
gism for a European contract code which should be applicable either through 
the parties’ choice of law (“opt in” solution) or as a dispositive regime for 
transnational cases if the parties had not excluded its application (“opt out” 
solution). The preparatory work was then assigned to a transnational network 
of academic expert groups. In 2008, these published a first and provisional 
academic draft of the common frame of reference (DCFR), which resembles a 
comprehensive codification of private law at European level.5 
Whereas the three building blocks of European private law just described - 
consumer law directives, ECJ jurisprudence, and the draft of a general instru-
ment – have evolved in a relatively co-ordinated way for decades, it seems that 
in the recent past, particularly in aftermath of the failure of the constitutional 
treaty they are increasingly drifting apart, mostly due to changed preferences in 
the European Commission and the ECJ’s effet utile driven approach to private 
law. This disaggregation becomes apparent not only in “mutual non-
consideration” but, what is worse, also in the turn away from a classic justice-
based concept of private law in favour of a regulatory framework for businesses. 
Against this background, the present contribution sets out to explicate the “three 
lives of European private law” and to discuss the implications of this fragmenta-
tion for the effectiveness and legitimacy of the field in the future. 
                                                 
3  KOM (2001), 398 endg. 
4  KOM (2003), 68 endg. 
5  Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, ed. Study Group 
and Acquis Group, Sellier, 2008. 
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The first life – the CFR process 
As mentioned, the drafting process for the Common Framework of Reference 
foreseen in the 2004 action plan was assigned to two networks of academic 
expert groups: the so-called Study Group on a European Civil Code (the fol-
low up group of the Lando group directed by the Prof. Christian von Bar) 
working on a classic comparative law basis and the Research Group on the 
Existing EC Private Law („Acquis-Group“, directed by Prof. Hans Schulte-
Nölke) aiming at developing European private law on the basis of the already 
existing legislative and judicial acquis in that field. The work of the groups 
was financed under the Sixth Framework Programme for Research and Devel-
opment, which was instrumentalised for that purpose. The work of the groups 
was accompanied by a so-called stakeholder network (representing civil soci-
ety) and by another network of Member State representatives. 
The academic draft common framework of reference (DCFR) jointly pub-
lished by both groups in 2008 is a compilation of principles and rules, which is 
in its external form practically identical to a continental style civil code. The 
DCFR comprises of 638 articles compiled into seven books which deal with 
general contract law, specific contracts and extracontractual obligations based 
on benevolent intervention in another’s affairs, tort/ delict (though these terms 
are avoided) and unjustified enrichment. Yet the present DCFR edition is still 
provisional: In October 2009, a revised version is announced to be published 
which will contain comments and illustrations (following the model of the Re-
statements of the American Law Institute already adopted by the PECL) on the 
rules which will explain their comparative and/or European law background; 
moreover, the revised version will be supplemented by three further books on 
immovables, pledges and trust. The whole compendium is expected to encom-
pass around 10.000 pages. As well as serving as a tool and a source of inspira-
tion for research and teaching, the academic DCFR is intended to provide a 
model for a political CFR to be adopted by the European Commission in 2010.  
Apparently at the last minute, the DCFR was endowed with a general intro-
duction devoted to the grand principles, values and legal policy considerations 
on which it is based. These include freedom of contract and its restrictions, bal-
ancing of values and policy objectives, economic welfare, protection of human 
rights, solidarity and social responsibility. However, this introduction seems to 
be a façade: the principles and values contained therein are of course not only 
very abstract but also frequently conflicting between each other, and the DCFR 
makes no effort to explain the formulation of its rules on the basis of the intro-
duction. In reality, the DCFR appears to be is a legal-technical instrument in the 
tradition of the grand continental codifications of the last centuries. Therefore, at 
least the present version may hardly be viewed as a political project bringing to 
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bear a welfare-oriented European social model, as called for by Mattei,6 Lurger7 
and Collins and others.8 Contrary to the expectations of the European Parlia-
ment, even the political CFR is unlikely to constitute a symbolic bedrock for a 
common identity of, and solidarity among, European citizens. This legal-
technical conception is democratically inadequate as rightly criticised by Hugh 
Collins and others; but, ironically perhaps, matches the EC tradition to guise po-
litical programmes (just think e.g. of the internal market programme) in techni-
cal terms. Sadly enough, the failure of the Constitutional Treaty has shown that 
the EU is not mature for grand political projects, which would include also a  
“societal constitution” in the form of a civil code. That notwithstanding, espe-
cially English commentators and officials reject any European private law in-
strument, even in a purely technical form, as they fear it could give rise to more 
interventionist EC legislation in future years.  
Though published only a year ago, the DCFR has already triggered a huge 
number of comments and criticisms. Having been compiled within a very short 
time frame, the DCFR has been rightly criticised for containing a number of 
flaws in legal craftsmanship: the sections prepared by the Study Group are not 
always coordinated with the sections prepared by the Acquis Group; the text is 
not always in conformity with standing EC law; and there are many extremely 
open-textured formulations and clauses which seem to delegate too much dis-
cretionary powers to courts and lead to unforeseeable decisions.9 Yet in our 
view, these flaws are serious but at the present stage not decisive as they could 
surely be remedied in a revised version if enough time were available. This has 
already been shown by the discussion following its publication in which a 
huge number of alternatives and improvements in all covered fields were pro-
posed.10 Moreover, the draft is accused of reflecting neither modern economic 
theory on market failures nor modern contract law phenomena such as infor-
mation rights and network arrangements in today’s service society.11 However, 
a coherent orientation by economic theory on market failures capable of meet-
ing consensus throughout Europe seems to be impossible to achieve, and none 
                                                 
6  U. Mattei, 'Hard Code Now!', (2002) 2(1) Global Jurist Frontiers Article 1. 
7  B. Lurger, Grundfragen der Vereinheitlichung des Vertragsrechts in der Europäi-
schen Union, 2002 
8  See H. Collins, The European Civil Code, 2007. 
9  See H. Eidenmüller/ F. Faust/ Hans Ch. Grigoleit/ N. Jansen/ G. Wagner/ R. Zim-
mermann, Der Gemeinsame Referenzrahmen für das Europäische Privatrecht, JZ 
2008, 529. 
10  See e.g. the edition 2008 Nr. 3 of the ECRL dedicated to the CFR. 
11  See S. Grundmann, The Structure of the DCFR – Which Aproach for Today’s Con-
tract Law?, ERCL 4 (2008), 225. 
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of the recent private law codifications at national level has ever made that 
claim. This is so because economic theory itself is extremely controversial and 
in constant evolution, with the latest strand labelled “behavioural law and eco-
nomics” relying on empirical experiments on human behaviour for the formu-
lation of legal rules (these experiments often show the limited value of infor-
mation to avoid bad bargains or similar mistakes). Moreover, modern phenom-
ena such as information and formation of contracts as well as network con-
tracts in today’s service society could still be regulated to the extent consensus 
can be achieved. However, also in most current national codifications they are 
missing without these legal systems being ineffective. From a yet more funda-
mental perspective, the DCFR has been criticised for being inable to capture 
the dynamic development of private law under democratic conditions. This 
argument is too radical in our view. It is of course true that the DCFR, just as 
any other national code, does not provide an exhaustive regulation of private 
law. In our view, a codification cannot achieve more than structuring the most 
important problems of private law – a task which the DCFR will be able to 
achieve at least after corrections and revisions. Its doctrinal fine-tuning, devel-
opment and constant extension of to new fields emerging as a result of techni-
cal progress and/or new commercial practices may legitimately be seen as be-
longing to courts. It is true, though, that the actual coming into force of a 
European instrument in private law would require a profound reform of the 
architecture of its judicial implementation by European and national courts.12 
The two crucial problems surrounding the CRF process are related to its de-
fective design and the unclear status of a political CRF. To start with the latter, 
the exact legal status of the (final) CFR was controversial right from the begin-
ning of the process. Whereas after the 2004 Action Plan the discussion focussed 
on the opt in vs. opt out dichotomy, it has become clear after the failure of the 
Constitutional Treaty that any legally binding instrument resembling a European 
Civil Code will not be accepted by a majority among Member States. Indeed, a 
hard code created on a soft law basis by academic experts without any popular 
legitimation would be democratically difficult to accept. Moreover, even at pri-
vate international law level, the application of the CFR as a private regime cho-
sen by the parties was debated on but finally excluded from the reform of the 
Rome I regulation. This would leave us with the remaining function of the CFR 
to act as a toolbox containing models for the revision of existing and the elabora-
tion of new European legislation – a function which was not respected in recent 
Community legislation in private law as we shall see below. 
                                                 
12  For more thoughts on this see, Ch. Schmid, Legitimacy Conditions of a European 
Civil Code, EUI Working Paper, Robert Schuman Center Series, no. 14/2001 = 
Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law  8 (2001), 277-298. 
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The even more pressing problem attaches to the institutional design of the 
CFR process. The process up until now has resembled the open method of 
governance: politically unaccountable academic experts chosen by a small 
group of project pioneers have elaborated the draft in accordance with their 
own self made procedural rules in non-public meetings; others have had little 
chance to influence the process as competition was apparently undesired by the 
Commission. The meetings with the stakeholder networks were too few, too 
short and too little prepared to enable any meaningful feedback and legitima-
tion by civil society. At the present stage, the DCFR would not, therefore, 
qualify as a legitimate hard code. The need to enhance both the scientific qual-
ity and the political legitimacy of the process is rather undeniable. If would 
seem, however, that both aims cannot be achieved under the current institu-
tional setting. As an alternative, a proposal voiced in 2000 before the European 
Parliament has received new attention in recent times: the creation of a Euro-
pean Law Institute on the model of the famous American counterpart institu-
tion. Such an institute would constitute an academically and politically legiti-
mised body to which the responsibility of elaborating an enhanced draft could 
be delegated. It could bundle, structure and consolidate discussions, enhance 
the quality of the work, improve the acceptance of the results among lawyers 
and ensure the compatibility of draft legislation with the social, economic and 
political context in which private law operates. Without such an institution, the 
CFR process will probably not have the potential for further development. Yet 
these considerations may become irrelevant anyway if the European Commis-
sion were to abandon the CFR process by limiting itself to EU consumer con-
tract law. 
The second life – EU consumer contract law  
As mentioned, the enactment of many directives in private, especially consumer 
law, which covered only selected subject matters and generated disintegrative 
effects on national private laws had in 2004 triggered the call for more coher-
ence which should be achieved through a general contract law instrument. Yet in 
2005, the political climate changed after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty 
in the French and Dutch referendums. The Commission indicated that from then, 
it would prioritise a revision of the consumer contract law acquis. Furthermore, 
leading personnel which had administered the CRF process in DG Sanco were 
transferred to other units. The prioritisation trend increased in the 2007 Green 
Paper on the revision of the consumer acquis in which the CRF process became 
manifestly disconnected. Initially, the consolidation of the acquis was limited to 
eight, later to only four directives. What is even more important, the Green Pa-
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per did not refer to the DCFR which was already available unofficially at that 
time though it contained a questionnaire with issues for consultation with alter-
native rule proposals all of which had already been dealt with in the DCFR.13 
This means that even the minimalist toolbox function of the CFR was frustrated, 
and the question which arises then is why the CFR had to be funded with a huge 
research budget in the first place.  
The scission between the CFR process and the consumer acquis was con-
firmed in the 2008 proposal for a Consumer Rights Directive (CRD). This 
scission is documented not only by the complete non-consideration of the 
CFR, even in cases in which the CRD deviates from existing acquis incorpo-
rated in the CFR. To give but one striking example, Art. 12 CDR on the con-
sumer’s right to withdrawal in off-premises and distance contracts surprisingly 
no longer refers to the notification of the withdrawal right to the consumer as 
starting point of the withdrawal period. This is in striking contrast not only to 
Art.  II-5:103 (2 b) and 104 DCFR but also to Art. 4 and 5 Doorstep Sales and 
Arts. 5 and 6 Distance Sales Directive.  
At a fundamental level, the scission is also shown by the fact that the CRD, 
unlike the CFR and all other national private law instruments, deviates from the 
classic ethical concept of private law which pursues justice among the parties in 
the individual case (normally commutative, sometimes also distributive justice) 
as highest objective. Instead, the CRD sacrifices justice among the parties in fa-
vour of providing European businesses with a basic but uniform regulatory 
framework for market transactions with consumers. This harsh judgment is 
based less on the fact that the CRD diminishes the standard of consumer protec-
tion in many instances – not only when compared to many Member States but 
also to the existing European acquis. Instead, it mainly derives from the legal-
technical consequences of the CRD’s maximum harmonisation approach,14 
which constitutes a straightjacket for private parties and Member States alike. 
Thereby, Member States may no longer provide for stronger consumer protec-
tion in national law but are strictly bound to the level foreseen in the Directive. 
The Commission has attempted to justify the need for maximum harmonisation 
                                                 
13  See M. Hesselink, The Consumer Rights Directive and the CFR: two worlds apart?, 
ERCL 5 (2009), 290, 294. 
14  The turn to maximum harmonisation, already opted for in the 2002 financial services 
distance sale directive, the 2005 unfair commercial practices directive and the 2008 
new consumer credit directive, is rightly viewed as a new era in European consumer 
law by H.-W. Micklitz and N. Reich, Der Kommissionvorschlag vom 8.10.2008 für 
eine Richtlinie über “Rechte der Vergraucher”, oder: “der Beginn des Ends einer 
Ära…”, EuZW 2009, 279; English version: Crónica de una muerte anunciada: The 
Commission Proposal for a Directive on Consumer Rights, Common Market Law 
Review 46 (2009), 471. 
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in a 300 pages impact assessment report annexed to the draft which postulates 
huge efficiency losses in cross border transactions due to persisting legal diver-
gences. As a response, the fully harmonised CRD wants to provide businesses 
with a single regulatory framework in order to eliminate the barriers stemming 
from the fragmentation of the rules and to complete the internal market in this 
area.15 Specifically, cross-border contracting on the basis of an identical set of 
standard contract terms shall be enabled.16 Contrary to the hollow propaganda 
aim of the Directive to enable also consumer trust and reliance through a single 
regulatory framework, consumers were of course far better served by a common 
minimum standard which could be, and actually was,17 extended by Member 
States to their benefit – whereas they are now subjected to a reduced standard of 
protection even in internal cases. 
The Directive’s maximum harmonisation approach conflicts with the clas-
sical concept and functioning of private law justice in various respects. To start 
with, private law is a complex fabric of considerations and values with differ-
ent legal-ethical roots. For example, with respect to a purchased good with a 
malfunctioning feature which causes a damage to the buyer, under German 
law, one needs to consider inter alia whether the buyer was deceived by the 
seller about the good’s feature in question, whether the buyer or both parties 
made an error in their assessment of the feature, whether the feature was stipu-
lated by the contract, whether the feature may normally be expected for similar 
goods, whether the defect is limited to the product itself or caused a damage to 
a separable part of the good, whether the defect affected the consumer’s health 
or other patrimony and/or caused any additional material or immaterial losses. 
Yet under the Directive only the conformity of the good with the contract (i.e. 
whether the feature was stipulated by the contract or may normally be expected 
for similar goods) is dealt with. How about, then, the legal provisions imple-
menting the other considerations? If one takes seriously the Directive’s aim of 
providing businesses with a single regulatory framework beyond which na-
tional law must not offer any additional protection to the consumer, they would 
all be pre-empted on the basis of maximum harmonisation. Under these condi-
tions, the doctrinal fine-tuning of legal-ethical considerations of which “justice 
among the parties” is the outcome would no longer be feasible. For example, it 
may not be just to exclude the seller’s liability for non-conformity according to 
                                                 
15  CRD, Recital 20. 
16  S. Whittacker, Unfair Contract Terms and Consumer Guarantees: the Proposal for a 
Directive on Consumer Rights and the Significance of ‚Maximum harmonisation’, 
ERCL 5 (2009), 223, 240. 
17  For details see the impressive EC Consumer Law Compendium elaborated for the 
European Commission by H. Schulte-Nölke/ Ch. Twig-Flessner/ M. Ebers in 2008. 
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Art. 24 Nr. 3 CRD when not only the buyer but both parties could not reasona-
bly have been unaware of the non-conforming feature. Similarly, it may be un-
just to exclude also the liability for defective products under tort law where a 
buyer who was injured by the product fails to communicate the non-
conformity of the product to the seller within two months according to Art. 28 
Nr. 4 CRD – containing the buyer’s obligation to inspect and report any non-
conformity of the good, a device which was previously contained in commer-
cial law only. However, if one allows the competing application of the CRD 
and tort law in these cases the aim of establishing a single regulatory frame-
work is obviously frustrated. In this context, it should also be noted that the 
Directive’s maximum harmonisation approach betrays not only national provi-
sions but also other EC law sources such as the Product Liability Directive 
(PLD). For a malfunctioning product will often not only lack conformity with 
the contract but also be defective in the sense of the PLD. Ironically, though 
there is no express stipulation to that effect in the PLD, the ECJ has also inter-
preted that Directive as a maximum standard,18 which was apparently over-
looked by the authors of the CRD. As a result, we are facing the logical incon-
sistency of two maximum standards which are of course defined by different 
legal requirements. 
Secondly, a context-sensitive and cautious application and development of 
private law by the judiciary, which enables justice among the parties, needs to 
fulfil a wide range of tasks: it needs to fill legislative gaps or concretise open-
textured provisions, adjust mistakes or wrong background assumptions of the 
legislator, develop the law to accommodate new factual problems and regula-
tory needs, or react to parties’ attempts at circumventing certain legal provi-
sions. At European level, it is already more than doubtful whether the ECJ 
would theoretically be able to fulfil these tasks, in particular as the social, eco-
nomic and political context in which private law is embedded is often charac-
terised by national or even regional peculiarities which cannot be addressed in 
a uniform way. Practically, as is well known, the European judiciary com-
pletely lacks the resources to administer consumer contract law for 350 million 
people; the average length of the preliminary reference procedure of about 2 
years already now causes excessive burdens to private parties. At national 
level, legislators and courts are barred from fulfilling these essential functions 
of private law through the means of maximum harmonisation - private law will 
so to speak be frozen in the state of the Directive.  
Specifically, developing the Directive in matters within its scope of applica-
tion or resorting to national law for the purpose of gap-filling is difficult and 
risky for national courts as the ECJ may later find that the Directive was inter-
                                                 
18  See below sub European jurisprudence. 
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preted in a wrong way or that its provisions were exhaustive and, therefore, the 
national provisions applied for the sake of (perceived) gap-filling pre-empted. 
For example, when Art. 7 CRD allows a commercial intermediary to state that 
he is acting in the name of and on behalf of a consumer so as to avoid the ap-
plication of consumer law, it is doubtful whether national measures against 
abuses are pre-empted for or not – for example the German “quasi-seller liabil-
ity” (Sachwalterhaftung) of a second hand car dealer who sells cars, in order to 
evade consumer protection, in the name of their previous owners who are con-
sumers.19 Furthermore, its not clear whether remedies for non-conformity not 
regulated in the Directive such as a direct claim against the producer of the 
non-conform good (the French action directe) or the English rejection right 
applying to non-conform goods may still be applied or are also pre-empted.20 
Moreover, Art. 27 Nr. 2 CRD states that the consumer may claim damages for 
any loss not remedied under the rules of non-conformity.21 However, this ex-
tremely wide formula leaves unclear the ambit of the recoverable damage (in-
terest in case of late replacement or repair?, costs of repair the consumer has 
carried out himself?, immaterial damage for the inability to enjoy the sold 
good?) and whether more detailed liability rules need to be developed autono-
mously on the basis of the Directive or whether national law may be resorted 
to for gap-filling; in the latter case, it would again be doubtful whether national 
liability standards might only be objective or also fault-based. In sum, when 
such central issues to which hundreds of pages in commentaries on national 
laws are devoted are no longer settled, but need to wait 2 years for clarification 
by the ECJ, the quality and foreseeability of judicial decisions which are essen-
tial preconditions for private law justice would be gravely affected and na-
tional private law systems might tumble into chaos. In addition, the Directive’s 
core objective of providing businesses with a single regulatory framework 
cannot be reached in the first place with similarly vague formulas. Instead, the 
fragmentary texture of the Directive cannot reasonably be expected to enable a 
just, socially sensitive and legitimate handling of consumer contract law. 
The third life: ECJ jurisprudence 
With the exception of private international and international procedural law 
and some cases on the impact of the basic freedoms on national private law, 
European jurisprudence on core areas of private law took a while to get started, 
                                                 
19  Example from Micklitz and Reich, op. cit., p. 491. 
20  See Micklitz and Reich, op. cit., 508ff. 
21  See again Micklitz and Reich, op. cit., 507f. 
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mainly since national implementation measures of European directives and the 
familiarisation of courts and practitioners with them were a slow process. For 
example, the first decision on the 1993 Unfair Terms Directive dates from 
2000 only, but since that year the ECJ was confronted with it not less than thir-
teen times. As well shall see, however, treating ECJ jurisprudence on core pri-
vate law as a separate third life of European private law is justified not only 
with respect to the quantity of judicial contributions to the field but more im-
portantly on account of its peculiar features which set it apart from the other 
“two lives”.   
From a purely external perspective, the ECJ has of course not turned its 
back on European private law in the same way as the CRD has done to the 
CRF. Instead, it goes without saying that the ECJ deals with European legisla-
tion brought before it, as this is precisely its job. As regards its relationship 
with the CFR, it is however too early as to draw any conclusions. Yet it is to be 
expected that the Court will at least occasionally use it when justifying its de-
cisions, just as it has taken into consideration other important soft law sources 
such as, most significantly, the Nice Fundamental Rights Charter. Last but not 
least, single members of the Court have also already shown their interest in the 
CFR process.22 
However, similar to European consumer contract law, we may find a scis-
sion at a deeper level: the ECJ, too, is inclined to sacrifice the classic ethical 
concept of private law in favour the effet utile – i.e. the maximisation of col-
lective policy goals, market integration in particular, underlying European leg-
islation. In other words, the Court tries to maximise the practical effectiveness 
of EC law without adequately reflecting its systematic embeddedness in its na-
tional law environment and the overall objective of justice among the parties. 
This criticism may be illustrated by the Court’s instrumentalist approach to 
consumer protection and its support of maximum harmonisation.  
Given its preponderance within European private law, consumer protection 
might be expected to provide an overarching interpretative metaprinciple. Yet 
it may be shown that the Court does not pursue a coherent consumer model. 
This thesis may be illustrated by referring to its interpretation of consumers’ 
information rights.23 Of course, there is absolutely nothing wrong with infor-
mation rights in themselves. As both economic analysis and contract practice 
                                                 
22  See e.g. the contribution of AG V. Trstenjak, Die Auslegung privatrechtlicher Richt-
linien durch den EuGH: Ein Rechtsprechungsbericht unter Berücksichtigung des 
Common Frame of Reference, ZeuP 2007, 145. 
23  The following analysis draws on Ch. Schmid, The Instrumentalist Conception of the 
Acquis Communautaire in Consumer Law and its Implications on a European Con-
tract Law Code, ERCL 1 (2005), 211. 
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show, information asymmetries among professional traders and consumers are 
a frequent type of market failure, which information rights are able to correct 
in many cases.24 In line with this basic finding, information rights constitute 
the most prominent and frequent regulatory tool in European consumer law. 
This seems to be inspired by the model of an inadequately informed consumer 
who is able to take rational decisions only after adequate information. Thus, to 
quote but one example, in the recent Cofidis case,25 the ECJ quashed national 
time limits restricting the exercise of consumer protection rights on the ground 
that consumers may ignore their rights completely, but needed to be protected 
all the same. 
Conversely, as regards national information rights, these are often found in-
consistent with the four market freedoms on proportionality grounds by the 
ECJ.26 In particular, in the field of misleading advertising, national informa-
tion rights requiring clear and unambiguous information are treated restric-
tively. In what boils down to an unrealistic assumption about market behav-
iour, consumers are for example supposed to recognise objectively wrong ma-
nipulative advertising statements27 or foreign-language labels similar to well-
known domestic products.28 In this jurisprudence, we seem to face the diffe-
rent model of a well-informed and intelligent consumer. As a result, consumer 
information requirements are construed widely in European consumer contract 
law, whereas national consumer protection-based limitations on the basic free-
doms in national unfair competition law are construed narrowly.29 However, 
this distinction is by no means justifiable under private law justice considera-
tions, as – in the words of Stefan Grundmann – one should not require a lower 
degree of attention from a consumer entering into contractual negotiations than 
from a consumer reading advertisements in his armchair.30 
                                                 
24  See generally, H. Fleischer, Informationsasymmetrie im Vertragsrecht (München: 
Beck, 2000). 
25  Case C-473/00 Cofidis, ECR 2002, I-10875. 
26  On the relationship of contract law and the market freedoms, see O. Remien, Zwin-
gendes Vertragsrecht und Grundfreiheiten des EGV (Tübingen: Mohr, 2003). 
27  Case C-470/93, Mars, ECR 1995, I-1923. In this decision, the ECJ argued that a 
consumer would not confuse the (larger) size of a „10% more“ advertisement on a 
chocolate package with the actual (smaller) increase in quantity. 
28  Case C-369/89, Piagème, ECR 1991, I-2971. 
29  This finding has recently also been confirmed by H. Unberath and A. Johnston, The 
Double-Headed Approach of the European Court concerning Consumer protection, 
Common Market Law Review 44 (2007), 1237. 
30  S. Grundmann, Europäisches Schuldvertragsrecht (Berlin; New York: De Gruyter, 
1999) 270, n 106. For a similar critique, see H. Fleischer, ‘Vertragsschlußbezogene 
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The background of this jurisprudence seems to be that national consumer 
protection instruments including information obligations have been recognised 
as valid limitations of the basic freedoms in the famous Cassis de Dijon31 ju-
risprudence. Therefore, a wide recognition of national information rights 
would reduce the effet utile of the market freedoms. At the end of the day, the 
different treatment of national and European information rights shows that the 
ECJ’s true concern is not a uniform model of a consumer and not even consu-
mer protection as such, but the optimisation of Community law irrespective of 
its contents and objectives. Thus, a coherent vision of consumer information in 
particular and private law in general is sacrificed to a “schematic effect utile” 
concept. Obviously, such a concept prevents private law from adequately ful-
filling its core task of realising justice between the parties. 
Similar tendencies may be shown in the Court’s support of a wide notion of 
maximum harmonisation in product liability and unfair competition law. The 
jurisprudence in this fields anticipates as it were the likely effects of maximum 
harmonisation in the ambit of the CRD. Regarding product liability law, the 
1985 Directive32 does not contain a minimum harmonisation clause, though 
most commentators read such a clause into it on account of its framework cha-
racter and the large number of gaps.33 This is fully plausible as, just as with the 
CRD, the fragmentary texture of the Directive cannot reasonably be expected 
do justice to this complex and socially highly sensitive matter governed by dif-
ferent national regulatory traditions.34 However, in three cases decided on 25 
April 2002, the ECJ found that no minimum harmonisation principle could be 
read into the Directive in the light of its paramount goal of establishing uni-
form regulation of product liability – so as to prevent market distorsions when 
undertakings in one State are forced to pay more to victims of dangerous prod-
                                                                                                                                                     
Informationspflichten im Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht’ (2000) Zeitschrift für Europäi-
sches Privatrecht 791. 
31  Case 120/78, Rewe/Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, ECR 1979, 649. 
32  Dir 85/374/EEC, OJEC 1985 L 210/29. 
33  See G. Brüggemeier, ‘Produkthaftung und Produktsicherheit’ (1988) 152 Zeitschrift 
für das Gesamte Handelsrecht 511, 531, 534; G. Howells, ‘Product Liability – A 
History of Harmonisation’, in A. Hartkamp et al (eds), Towards a European Civil 
Code (Demeter: Kluwer, 3rd ed forthcoming). 
34  See H. Koch, ‘Internationale Produkthaftung und Grenzen der Rechtsangleichung 
durch die EG-Richtlinie’ (1988) 152 Zeitschrift für das Gesamte Handelsrecht 537; 
the incomplete character of the directive becomes visible also in its complex inter-
play with product safety law, see G. Howells, ‘The Relationship between Product 
Liability and Product Safety – Understanding a Necessary Element in the European 
Product Liability Through a Comparison with the US Position’ (1999-2000) 39 
Washburn Law Journal 305. 
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ucts than in others.35 In doing so, the ECJ deprived a Spanish plaintiff, whose 
health had been seriously affected by the transfusion of infected blood in a 
public hospital, of a claim for damages against the hospital existing under a 
Spanish product liability statute.36 The reason for this was that – unlike under 
Spanish law which followed US law in this respect –, the victim can only sue 
the producer of the defective product, but in general not another member in the 
commercial chain – such as the hospital which had not produced the infected 
blood itself in this case. Alongside the Spanish case, the ECJ convicted France 
and Greece in a treaty infringement procedure as they had not transposed the 
Directive word by word into national law, but had tried to remedy some of its 
apparent shortcomings such as the minimum threshold required for the restitu-
tion of damages (Selbstbeteiligung in German, and franchise or franchigia 
respectively in French and Italian).37 
This jurisprudence sacrifices national consumer protection without even 
any visible gain for European industries. Indeed, the narrow scope of applica-
tion of the European Directive and its many gaps render its objective to pro-
vide European undertakings with a uniform product liability regime absolutely 
illusory.38 As a result, the ECJ has in this case petrified a nearly 20 year old 
                                                 
35  The rejection of this jurisprudence seems to be quasi unanimous among European 
commentators: See G. Viney, ‘L’Interprétation par la CJCE de la Directive du 25 
Juillet 1985 sur la Responsabilité du Fait des Produits Défectueux’ (2002) I 177 La 
Semaine Juridique 1945; J. Calais-Auloy, ‘Menace européene sur la jurisprudence 
francaise concernant l’obligation de sécurité du vendeur professionel’ (2002) 31 Re-
cueil Le Dalloz 1458; A. Palmieri and R. Pardolesi, ‘Difetti del prodotto e del diritto 
privato europeo’ (2002) Il Foro Italiano IV 296; Ch. Joerges, Zur Legitimität der 
Europäisierung des Privatrechts. Überlegungen zu einem Recht-Fertigungs-Recht 
für das Mehrebenensystem der EU, EUI Working Paper LAW 2003/2 30 et seq; M.-
E. Arbour, ‘Compensation for Damage Caused by Defective Drugs: European Priva-
te Law between Safety Requirements and Free-Market Values’ (2004) 10 European 
Law Journal 87. 
36  Case C-183/99 González Sánchez [2002] ECR I-3901 (ECJ). 
37  Cases C-52/00 Commission v France [2002] ECR I-3827 (ECJ) and C-154/00 
Commission v Greece [2002] ECR I-3879 (ECJ). 
38  See the telling comment by a leading German practitioner: J. Schmidt-Salzer and H. 
Hollmann, Kommentar EG-Richtlinie Produkthaftung, vol 1 (Heidelberg: Recht und 
Wirtschaft, 1986) Einl IV, 135 et seq, n 73 et seq, 79:  
‘Hält man sich die Milliarden und Abermilliarden von Produkten vor Augen, die 
jährlich innerhalb des Gemeinsamen Marktes veräußert werden, ist bereits bei Be-
schränkung auf den in der Richtlinie geregelten Bereich (Personenschäden, private 
Sachschäden) betriebswirtschaftlich der Nachweis, daß innerhalb der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft die unterschiedlichen Haftungsregeln die Warenströme beeinflussen, 
abwegig. Dazu sind die Unterschiede des Haftungsrechts letztlich zu gering und tre-
ten Produkthaftungsansprüche relativ viel zu selten auf. Die Beobachtung des An-
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piece of legislation already infused with massive shortcomings. In doing so, it 
prevents Member States from adequately fulfilling their responsibility of pro-
viding industry and consumers with a socially and economically adequate and 
consistent product liability law.39  
A similar development has in the meantime also taken place in regard of the 
2005 Unfair Commercial Practices Directive which explicitly adheres to the 
principle of maximum harmonisation. In the case VTB-VAB v. Total Belgium 
of 23/4/2009 the Court was confronted with a provision of Belgian unfair 
competition law which established a presumption of unlawfulness of combined 
offers of unrelated products (a certain product may only be bought or is recei-
ved for free by a consumer when another product is bought). According to the 
schematic reasoning of the ECJ, the national rule was in flagrant violation of 
EC law as it fell in a matter exhaustively regulated by the Directive and as it 
did not respect the maximum harmonisation principle:40 
“(…)  In the first place, Article 54 of the 1991 Law lays down the principle that 
combined offers are prohibited, notwithstanding the fact that such practices are 
not referred to in Annex I to the Directive.  As has been pointed out in para-
graph 56 of the present judgment, that annex exhaustively lists the only com-
mercial practices which are prohibited in all circumstances and accordingly do 
not have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the Directive precludes 
                                                                                                                                                     
teils, den (unter Ausklammerung 1. der US-Schäden, 2. der gewerblichen Sachschä-
den und 3. der Produkt-Vermögensschäden die sog. konventionellen Produktschäden 
innerhalb der Betriebshaftpflichtversicherung haben, belegt eindeutig, daß es sich im 
Vergleich zu den Warenvolumina um eine quantité négligeable handelt (...) Die vor-
genannten Beispiele belegen, daß ein Unternehmen (…) schlichtweg fahrlässig han-
deln würde, wenn es seinen Warenstrom-Dispositionen und -Kalkulationen die Haf-
tungsregelungen der EG-Richtlinie zugrunde legen würde.’  
Paradoxically, it seems to be exactly the ineffectiveness of the directive which has 
made it an attractive model for legislators worldwide, who want to boast a high con-
sumer protection standard without effectively limiting their industries. See M. Re-
imann, ‘Product Liability in a Global Context: the Hollow Victory of the European 
Model’ (2003) European Review of Private Law 128.  
39  It may be added that this case law also leads to a different treatment of various 
Member States: Art 13 of the directive explicitly allows the application of compet-
ing national liability regimes based on contract or tort. However, in the lack of legis-
lative action, national courts for example in Germany have developed traditional tort 
law into a fully fledged product liability regime. As a result, those Member States 
which - more or less by chance - have developed a product liability regime formally 
still based on fault (though in practice converted into one close to liability without 
fault by the inversion of the burden of proof and similar judicial devices) would 
probably be allowed to keep it whereas others such as Spain, whose legislatures 
have opted for a strict liability regime, have to accept the primacy of the directive.  
40  C-261/07 (VTB-VAB v. Total Belgium) of 23/4/2009 at no. 60ff. 
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the system implemented by Article 54 of the 1991 Law in so far as that article 
prohibits, generally and pre-emptively, combined offers without any verification 
of their unfairness in the light of the criteria laid down in Articles 5 to 9 of the 
Directive. Next, by operating in that manner, a rule of the type at issue in the 
main proceedings runs counter to the content of Article 4 of the Directive, 
which expressly prohibits Member States from maintaining or adopting more 
restrictive national measures, even where such measures are designed to ensure 
a higher level of consumer protection (…)” 
Admittedly, the result of this decision is much less worrying than the product 
liability decisions. Yet in terms of legal reasoning, the outcomes are identical: 
under the Court’s schematic interpretation of the pre-emption doctrine, the 
content of national measure and its contribution to justice among the parties 
are irrelevant, only the occupation of the legal terrain by European measures 
counts. With such decisions, the Court largely contributes to an instrumentalist 
conception of European legislation which places the effet utile of market inte-
gration above all – including above justice among the parties. 
Conclusion 
As this contribution has demonstrated, the current disaggregation of European 
private law in three lives becomes apparent not only in the “mutual non-
consideration” of the CFR and European consumer contract law but, what is 
far worse, also in the shift of European legislation and jurisprudence from a 
classic justice-based concept of private law to a single regulatory framework 
for businesses. Thus, the European system of multi level governance is com-
plemented by an internal fragmentation of European private law, which 
amounts to a sort of “multi-compartment governance”. What should be the 
consequences of this situation? Our answer is grim: A European regime which 
is not able to safeguard its internal coherence and orientation towards justice as 
the key objective of private law does not enjoy the legitimacy to set aside and 
disintegrate national private laws, which still constitute more or less well func-
tioning systems upholding justice among citizens. Instead, European private 
law should resort to classic justice-oriented legal instruments which do not suf-
fer from market integration biases. An enhanced CRF institutionally legiti-
mised by a European Law Institute could be such an instrument. Conversely, 
the imposition of maximum harmonisation and the subversion of national so-
cial standards as in product liability law should stop. 
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